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"Eminent domain is the right or power to take private property
for public use."' "The Fifth Amendment ...provides [property owners]
with important protection against abuse of the power of eminent
domain by the Federal Government. ' 2 The Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution states, "nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." 3 In its Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has struggled to determine what
exactly constitutes a legitimate "public use."

1.
United States v. 209.25 Acres of Land, More or Less, 108 F. Supp. 454, 459
(W.D. Ark. 1952).
2.
United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 236-37 (1946).
3.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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One point on which the Court seems to agree is that a
"sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose
of
transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just
compensation." 4 The Court's early decisions construed the "public use"
requirement narrowly by requiring public ownership of the
condemned property, 5 but the Court later expanded its understanding
of the provision and allowed for transfer of condemned private
property to other private entities as long as the property was put to a
"public use." 6 Many argue that the Court's present-day interpretation
is overly broad in reading "public use" to mean "public purpose," thus
rendering the "public use" requirement essentially meaningless and
7
superfluous.
There are new concerns, however, over the proper breadth of
the interpretation of the "public use" requirement in light of the
Court's 2005 decision in Kelo v. New London.8 In Kelo, the Court
explains that the transfer of property from one private party to
another, where that transfer is part of an economic development plan,
is a legitimate "public use." 9 Therefore, states are free to transfer
private property from one private party to another through eminent
domain where the legislature has determined that the transfer would
create economic growth and development.
Today, several cities have decided, or are -considering whether
or not to enhance their communities and promote economic growth by
building new sports stadiums, either to attract new professional sports
franchises, or to entice an existing sports franchise to remain in that
city. These cities believe that the sports franchise, and consequently a
new stadium, will create economic growth and community
development. Therefore, some cities argue that the use of eminent
domain is necessary for the completion of each of these stadium
projects. For example, on December 31, 2005, the Indianapolis
Building Authority filed an eminent domain case against the Hurst
bean factory to secure more parking spaces for the Indianapolis Colts'

4.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2661 (2005).
5.
Thomas W. Merrill, The Goods, The Bads, And The Ugly: The Fifth Amendment
Says That the Government Can Take Private Property from Its Owners for Public Use. Just
What That Means Is a Question the Supreme Court Is Reconsidering,LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb.
2005, at 16.

6.

Id.

7.
Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
8.
Id. at 2665 (allowing a private development corporation to acquire a private home
through eminent domain for the purposes of building a new hotel).
9.
Id.
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new stadium. 10 Battles over the propriety of eminent domain for
stadium projects are hotly contested issues in cities such as
Indianapolis and Brooklyn. Property owners and community groups
are extremely concerned about the latitude given to local legislatures
to take property by eminent domain for such projects.
Part I of this note briefly discusses the principle of eminent
domain and the evolution of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Takings Clause. Part II analyzes the application of the Court's
interpretations of the "public use" requirement of the Takings Clause
on the issue of whether it is proper for a state to exercise its power of
eminent domain pursuant to a stadium development project. Finally,
Part III offers a solution to the conflict between property owners'
interests in keeping their land and cities' interests in creating
economic growth.
I. BACKGROUND: INTRODUCTION TO EMINENT DOMAIN IN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE

Eminent domain "is an inherent and necessary attribute of
sovereignty and exists independently of constitutional provisions and
is superior to all property rights."'" "If the United States has
determined its need for certain land for a public use that is within its
federal sovereign powers, it must have the right to appropriate that
land.' 2 "Otherwise, the owner of the land, by refusing to sell it or by
consenting to do so only at an unreasonably high price, is enabled to
subordinate the constitutional powers of Congress to his personal
will."'1 3 "The Fifth Amendment, in turn, provides [property owners]
with important protection against abuse of the power of eminent
domain by the Federal Government."' 4 The Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution states that "private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation."1 5 Although this
provision, commonly referred to as the Takings Clause, does not
mention what would happen if the government took private property
for private use, the Court has tacitly recognized the clause as a

10.
A Blight on the Law: Thanks to Indianapolis' Lust for the Colts, Perhaps All
Our Property Will Be a Little Safer, FT. WAYNE NEWS SENTINEL (Ind.), Jan. 5, 2006, at A4,
available at 2006 WLNR 252194.
11.
United States v. 209.25 Acres of Land, More or Less, 108 F. Supp. 454, 459

(W.D. Ark. 1952).
12.

United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 236 (1946).

13.

Id.

14.

Id. at 236-37.

15.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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statement of a "preexisting power to take private property for public
use, rather than a grant of new power."'16 Thus, "it imposes on the
Federal Government the obligation to pay just compensation when it

takes another's property for public use in accordance with the federal
sovereign power to appropriate it."'17 The Court has never interpreted
the Takings Clause to allow the government to take private property
for purely private purposes.
In the case of U.S. v. Carmack, the Court recognized that the
question of whether a taking is for a public use is one solely for the
judiciary to consider."' Prior to Carmack, there was some confusion
over whether the right of judicial review existed for public use
determinations. 19 This confusion probably arose because of numerous
cases where the courts had held that the 'legislative determination
that the use was public did not exceed the constitutional bounds." 20 As
the Court recited in United States v. 170.88 Acres of Land,
[T]he courts have [the] power to determine whether the use for which private
property is authorized by the legislature to be taken is in fact a public use, yet, if
this question is decided in the affirmative, the judicial function is exhausted; ...
the extent to which such property shall be taken for such use rests wholly in the
legislative
discretion, subject only to the restraint that just compensation must be
21
made.

A. JudicialInterpretationand the Evolution of the Public Use
Requirement
Although the Court has made it perfectly clear that a
"sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of
transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just
compensation," 22 the Court has also stated that "a State may transfer
property from one private party to another if future 'use by the public'
16.
Carmack, 329 U.S. at 241-42.
17.
Id. at 242.
18.
Id. at 236-37 (stating that the judicial review required by "[tihe Fifth
Amendment... provides [a property owner] with important protection against abuse of the
power of eminent domain by the Federal Government"). For another case explaining the
power of the judiciary to decide such matters, see United States ex rel. v. Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 558 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that
"whether a taking is for a public purpose is not a question beyond judicial competence").
19.
United States v. 209.25 Acres of Land, More or Less, 108 F. Supp. 454, 459
(W.D. Ark. 1952).
20.
Id.
21.
United States v. 170.88 Acres of Land, 106 F. Supp. 623, 624 (E.D. Ky. 1952)
(quoting Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1893)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
22.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2661 (2005).
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is the purpose of the taking."23 This distinction has created much
controversy over the years as the Supreme Court developed and
refined its interpretation thereof. The Court first construed the
requirement narrowly by requiring public ownership of the
condemned property, but then expanded the meaning of public use to
allow for transfer of condemned private property to other private
entities as long as the property was put to a "public use." Later,
however, the Court construed the "public use" requirement as more of
a "public purpose" requirement. Many argue that the transformation
of the requirement from "public use" to "public purpose" is an overly
broad interpretation that essentially renders the "public use"
requirement entirely meaningless and superfluous. 24 These three
historical interpretations are discussed in more detail below.
1. Public Ownership
"Public ownership" has always been regarded as an
''uncontroversial minimal definition" of the "public use" requirement of
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. 25 "Under this basic definition, a
taking is for public use if the government will own and control the
property after the condemnation is complete." 26 A typical assertion of
eminent domain that would fit within this definition includes
27
acquiring land for a highway.
2. Actual Use by the Public
Beginning in the early 1800s, courts began entrusting the
power of eminent domain to private entities such as privately-owned
railroads, canals and turnpikes. 28 This practice shows that "courts
have almost never regarded public ownership as a complete definition
of public use. '2 9 Under this much more inclusive interpretation of the
"public use" requirement, the Court has allowed transfers of

23.
Id.
24.
Id. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Once one permits takings for public
purposes in addition to public uses, no coherent principle limits what could constitute a
valid public use-at least, none beyond Justice O'Connor's . . .appeal to the text of the
Constitution itself.").
25.
Merrill, supra note 5, at 16; see Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d 86
(N.J. 2002) (holding that condemnation of property was for a public use where municipality
retains ownership and the road remains open to the public).
26.
Merrill, supra note 5, at 16.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
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condemned property to other private entities where the property
would be put to "actual use" by the public.
In Clark v. Nash,30 however, the Supreme Court "recognized
the inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test. ' 31 The
Court held that in arid land states, private individuals may condemn
a right of way across another's property in order to enlarge a ditch for
irrigation purposes. 32 The Court found that in Western states a
private individual's use of water for irrigation could be considered a
33
public use.
The Clark decision began the expansion of the "public use"
requirement to include "public purpose" or "public benefit." In Mt.
Vernon- Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co.,
the Court ruled in favor of a private power company's right to
condemn land for the "public purpose" of manufacturing, supplying,
and selling water power to the public. 34 Responding to the property
owners' contention that the purpose of the condemnation was not a
public one, the court stated that
[I]n the organic relations of modern society it may sometimes be hard to draw the
line that is supposed to limit the authority of the legislature to exercise or delegate
the power of eminent domain. But to gather the streams from waste and to draw
from them energy, labor without brains, and so to save mankind from toil that it
can be spared, is to supply what, next to intellect, is the very foundation of all our
achievements and all our welfare. If that purpose is not public, we should be at a
loss to say what
is. The inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test
35
is established.

3. Public Purpose or Public Benefit
The Supreme Court has stated that "where the exercise of the
eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose, [this] Court has never held a compensated taking to be
proscribed by the Public Use Clause. '36 It is also well recognized that
"[t]he mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is
transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not

30.
Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 370 (1905).
31.
Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906)
(commenting on the Court's holding in Clark, 198 U.S. at 370).
32.
Clark, 198 U.S. at 370.
33.
See id.
34.
Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S.
30, 32 (1916).
35.
Id.
36.
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
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condemn that taking as having only a private purpose." 37 In fact, there
are many instances where the Court has found that the transfer of
private property to other private entities serves a public purpose, thus
falling within the limits of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
Among these are (1) the elimination of blight,3 8 (2) regulation of an
40
oligopoly,3 9 and (3) economic development.
a. Elimination of Blight
Prior to Berman v. Parker, the Court looked for "public
ownership" to satisfy the "public use" requirement with respect to
community redevelopment projects. 41 In Berman, however, the Court
expanded the public use doctrine by recognizing that public ownership
is not the only way to promote the public purposes of community
redevelopment projects. 42 The Supreme Court broadly interpreted
"public use" to include the "public purpose" of eliminating blighted
areas. 43 The Court found that because blighted areas are "injurious to
the public health, safety, morals, and welfare," the government, by
eliminating such injurious conditions, creates a public benefit and
furthers a public purpose by protecting and promoting the welfare of
the people. 44 The properties condemned in Berman were considered to
be blighted because most of the buildings, which housed a large
number of the area's residents, were beyond repair. 45 The city created
a redevelopment plan under which the entire area would be
condemned (even certain properties that were not beyond repair) to
facilitate the construction of streets, schools, and other public facilities
or the sale to private parties, who would in turn build low-cost
housing. 46 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Douglas affirmed
the public use underlying the taking:
37.
Id. at 243-44.
38.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954).
39.
Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 241-42.
40.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665-66 (2005).
41.
Cf. Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55 (1925) (holding as
constitutional Congress's authorization of takings by the Secretary of War of land for
military housing purposes); Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923)
(upholding the California legislature's authorization of the taking of land for two public
highways that would be used by the public for travel).
42.
Berman, 348 U.S. at 34.

43.

Id. at 35.

44.
See id. (holding that "the [eminent domain] standards prescribed were adequate
for executing the plan to eliminate not only slums ... but also the blighted areas that tend
to produce slums").
45.
Id. at 30.

46.

Id.
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We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not
desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive... The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies
have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not
for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that
the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as
well as sanitary, there is nothing in the
47
Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.

b. Regulation of an Oligopoly
In contrast to Berman, where the Court recognized the
elimination of blight as an appropriate public purpose, Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff embarked upon the public purpose of
reducing the high concentration of land ownership in Hawaii which
resulted from a centuries-old land oligopoly. 48 The Court ultimately
upheld the lower court's decision, which transferred private property
from lessors to lessees for just compensation. The Court rejected the
view that the condemnation was "a naked attempt on the part of the
state of Hawaii to take the property of A and transfer it to B solely for
B's private use and benefit" and reaffirmed the deferential Berman
approach to legislative judgments. 49 According to the Court, "[t]he
mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is
transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not
condemn that taking as having only a private purpose." 50 "[I]t is only
the taking's purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny
51
under the Public Use Clause."
c. Economic Development
In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court held that
economic development qualified as a valid public use, such that
eminent domain could be used to convert private property into
commercial space. 52 As a city with high unemployment, New London
hoped that the nearby construction of a pharmaceutical research
47.
Id. at 33.
48.
467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984).
49.
Id. at 235 (quoting the lower court's opinion in Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788,
798 (9th Cir. 1983)).
50.
Id. at 243-44.
51.
Id. at 244.
52.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005) (holding that because
the use of eminent domain in the city's plan "unquestionably serves a public purpose, the
takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment").
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facility would rejuvenate the area. 53 To capitalize on the new facility,
the city developed a plan which included a waterfront conference
hotel, restaurants, retail shops, marinas, new residences, a museum,
offices, and "water-dependent commercial uses." 54 "In addition to
creating jobs, generating tax revenue, and helping to 'build
momentum for the revitalization of downtown New London,' . . . the
plan was also designed to make the City more attractive and to create
leisure and recreational opportunities." 55 Creating such a development
required the taking of several residential properties, despite the
absence of any "allegation that any of these properties is blighted or
otherwise in poor condition; rather, they were condemned only
56
because they happen to be located in the development area."
The Court had already "rejected any literal requirement that
condemned property be put into use for the general public," and
therefore did not hold New London to that standard in Kelo.5 7 Instead,
the Court deferred to the city's "determination that the area was
58
sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation."
As the city had a "carefully considered" development plan, the Court
did not believe that the City was "tak[ing] property under the mere
pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a
private benefit." 59 The Court ultimately stated, "For more than a
century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid
formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad
latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the
60
takings power."
Justice Thomas, in dissent, stated that this jurisprudence has
"strayed from the Clause's original meaning" and that the Court
should reconsider its interpretation. 6 1 Thomas believes that the Court
has transformed the "Public Use" Clause into the "Public Purpose"
Clause or the "Diverse and Always Evolving Needs of Society
Clause." 62 In a separate dissent, Justice O'Connor stated that the

53.
Id. at 2658-59. The development plan was "projected to create in excess of 1,000
jobs, to increase tax and other revenues, and to revitalize an economically distressed city."
Id. at 2658 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 507 (Conn. 2004)).
54.
Id. at 2659.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 2660.
57.
Id. at 2662 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)).
58.
Id. at 2665.
59.
Id. at 2661.
60.
Id. at 2664.
61.
Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
62.
Id. (quoting Justice Stevens's majority opinion, id. at 2662).
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majority "holds that the sovereign may take private property currently
put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary private
use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary
benefit for the public."63 She continued, "nearly any lawful use of real
private property can be said to generate some incidental benefit to the
public," which means that the Court's reading of "the words 'for public
use' do[es] not realistically exclude any takings, and thus do[es] not
'64
exert any constraint on the eminent domain power.
B. Standard of Scrutiny for Public Use Takings: Rational Basis Test
In Midkiff and Berman, the Supreme Court declared that "a
taking should be upheld as consistent with the Public Use Clause as
long as it is 'rationally related to a conceivable public purpose."' 65 As
Justice Kennedy points out in his Kelo concurrence, "[t]his deferential
standard of review echoes the rational-basis test used to review
economic regulation under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses." 66 Under the rational basis test, however, it is still necessary
for the Court to determine whether a transfer to a private party
67
created only "incidental or pretextual public benefits."
A court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause should strike
down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private
party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits, just as a court applying
rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause must strike down a
government classification that is clearly intended to injure a particular
class of
68
private parties, with only incidental or pretextual public justifications.

Thus, with this standard in mind,
Where the purpose [of a taking] is economic development and that development is
to be carried out by private parties or private parties will be benefited, the court
must decide if the stated public purpose-economic advantage to a city sorely in
need of it-is only incidental
to the benefits that will be confined on private parties
69
of a development plan.

The Court in Kelo concluded that benefiting Pfizer Corporation,
the private entity, was not "the primary motivation or effect of this

63.
Id. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64.
Id.
65.
Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 241 (1984)).
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Id.; see also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47, 450
(1985); Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-36 (1973).
69.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (alteration in original)
(quoting the trial court in the case).
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development plan," and that "[t]here is nothing in the record to
indicate that . . . [respondents] were motivated by a desire to aid
[other] particular private entities." 70 According to Justice Kennedy,
Kelo survived the "meaningful rational basis review that . . . is
required under the Public Use Clause." 71 Justice Kennedy does leave
room for a possible heightened standard of scrutiny in cases where
there are "private transfers in which the risk of undetected
impermissible favoritism of private parties is so acute that a
presumption (rebuttable or otherwise) of invalidity is warranted under
the Public Use Clause." 72 However, Justice Kennedy also asserted that
a stricter level of scrutiny is not required "simply because the purpose
73
of the taking is economic development."
Thus, although it has been well recognized and long accepted
that a "sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose
of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid
just compensation," 74 it is equally clear that in certain cases, where
the government's strategy for a condemned parcel of land includes the
use of a private party (such as a private developer), the Court has
justified such a transfer of property to a private party as serving some
75
kind of "public purpose."
Justice O'Connor, in Midkiff, greatly expanded the Supreme
Court's "public purpose" jurisprudence by stating that the government
does not surpass its eminent domain power as long as the taking is
"rationally related to a conceivable public purpose." 76 In light of
Justice O'Connor's statement, the Court's recent decision in Kelo,
although controversial, merely "carries out the Court's eminent
domain jurisprudence to its logical extreme."77 As Justice Stevens
reminds us in Kelo,
[F]or more than a century, [the Court's] public use jurisprudence has wisely
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures
78
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of takings power.
...When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational,

70.
Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (alterations in original) (quoting the trial
court in the case).
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 2661.
75.
See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984); Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
76.
Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 241.
77.
Shelley Ross Saxer, Thoughts on Kelo v. City of New London, SL005 ALI-ABA
79, 81 (2005) (Westlaw).
78.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2664.
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our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings - no less,
than debates over the wisdom of other79kinds of socioeconomic legislation - are not
to be carried out in the federal courts.

There have been several instances since the ruling in Kelo
where states encounter the eminent domain issue in the context of
building professional sports stadiums. 80 As long as the sports stadium
is completely publicly funded, any taking is arguably justified under
the "public ownership" prong of the Court's eminent domain
jurisprudence. It is also fairly clear that any privately-owned sports
stadium would need to rely on Kelo and the economic development
prong of the Court's eminent domain jurisprudence (in the absence of
blight) in order to justify a taking. What is less clear is whether a
partially privately-funded sports stadium would similarly need to rely
on Kelo and economic development. Where such stadium projects
must rely on Kelo to justify a taking, it seems that as long as a
stadium project is tied to some sort of economic development plan
(which the Court in Kelo agrees is a valid public purpose) then the
taking should not violate the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause
unless it is proven that stadium projects are an irrational means of
furthering an economic development scheme or that the state's
primary motivation is to aid the stadium/franchise owners.
II. ANALYSIS
Whether one agrees with the Court's ruling in Kelo, 8 ' states are
going forward with eminent domain procedures under this new
interpretation of the law.8 2 The issue addressed here is whether states
should be able to take private property to build professional sports
stadiums. Courts have considered sports stadiums a public use even
before the Kelo opinion was handed down.8 3 Since many stadiums now

79.

Id. at 2667 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 242) (internal quotation

marks omitted)..
80.
See, e.g., Robert Seigel, Inc., v. Dist. of Columbia, 892 A.2d 387 (D.C. 2006)
(dismissing on ripeness grounds an eminent domain proceeding by owners of land on site of

proposed baseball stadium).
81.
For arguments supporting and critiquing the Court's ruling, see Elizabeth F.
Gallagher, Note, Breaking New Ground: Using Eminent Domain for Economic
Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1837 (2005).
82.
See Matthew Tully, Landowners Find it Hard to Make Way for Stadium,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 18, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 7866972.
83.
N.J. Sports & Expo. Auth. v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 580, 589 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1971) (stating that "the determination of what constitutes a public purpose is
primarily a function of the Legislature and should not be overruled by the courts except in
instances where that determination is clearly arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable")
(citation omitted).
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receive at least partial private funding, and are privately operated,
these stadium projects would need to rely on the economic
development rationale in Kelo to justify a taking. The first section of
this analysis considers whether or not private and semi-privately
owned sports stadiums should qualify as "economic development" for
purposes of the public use requirement. The second section discusses
whether, assuming such sports stadiums are not an appropriate public
use, there is anything that can be done to prohibit states from using
the power of eminent domain to take property from private owners to
build public or private sports stadiums.
Several states, such as New York and Indiana, are currently
dealing with this issue. In Brooklyn, New York City is preparing to
construct a new $3.5 billion Atlantic Yards project.8 4 Forest City
Ratner Companies, headed by Bruce Ratner, is the private developer
for the project, which will ultimately include offices, retail space,
housing and a stadium for the New Jersey Nets professional
basketball team.8 5 Financing for the stadium has been secured
through private investors as well as public funds.8 6 The city and state
are each slated to contribute $100 million to the estimated $1 billion
project, whereas Forest City Ratner Companies, the private
developing company, is the biggest owner with a 21% stake.8 7 In an
amicus brief submitted in Kelo supporting the City of New London
Development Group, the community organization Brooklyn United for
Innovative Local Development (BUILD) argued that such a project
was necessary to promote economic development for the benefit of
those living in the area and is a legitimate objective.88 In their brief,
BUILD also argued that the ruling in Kelo would have no effect on the
proposed Atlantic Yards project, since it will be built in a blighted
area, and New York law "does not authorize eminent domain
exclusively for economic development purposes."8 9 Other community
groups in Brooklyn, however, vehemently oppose the development
project and the prospect of Ratner using eminent domain to obtain the

Christopher Montgomery, Ratners Target New York: New York Flagship Project
84.
is a $3.5 Billion Proposed Brooklyn Development with 16 Buildings and 7,300 Units of
Housing, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 30, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 19304560.
85.
Id.

86.
87.

Id.
Id.

Brief for Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (BUILD) et al. as
88.
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005)
(No. 04-108), 2005 WL 154143.

89.

Id.
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last few parcels of necessary land, arguing that the project will destroy
"a vibrant neighborhood - not what Forest City calls a blighted area."90
Indiana is also fighting the eminent domain battle over its new
stadium project for the Indianapolis Colts football team. Colts owner
Jim Irsay and the Indianapolis mayor agreed to the stadium project
late last year. Under the agreement, the Colts would contribute $100
million to the approximately $625 million dollar project. 91 The
contribution came, however, only after the city agreed to pay the Colts
$48 million in order to break their current lease. 92 The lone holdout in
the Colts stadium saga is the Hurst Bean Factory, against whom the
Indiana Stadium and Convention Center Building Authority recently
filed an eminent domain lawsuit. 93 The actual stadium will not even
sit on the Hurst property. 94 The Hurst Bean Factory is slated to be
95
replaced by a stadium parking lot.
A. Privateand Semi-Private Sports Stadiums Should Not Qualify as a
Public Use Under the Court's Current Eminent Domain Jurisprudence
According to the principles set forth by the Supreme Court, a
taking does not violate the Fifth Amendment as long as it is
"rationally related to a conceivable public purpose." 96 The Court in
Kelo also makes clear that the "mere pretext of a public purpose"
would not be sufficient to avoid a Fifth Amendment violation where
the "actual purpose [is] to bestow a private benefit."97 Since the Court
clarified in Kelo that an economic development plan is a conceivable
public purpose, 98 a court would have to determine whether a project to
build a new professional sports stadium could ever be rationally
related to such an economic development plan, and whether an
economic development plan centered around the construction of a new
sports stadium is merely a pretext of a public purpose.
At the state court level, three dissenting justices in the Kelo
case suggested that the court should have "imposed a 'heightened'
90.
Montgomery, supra note 84.
91.
Matthew Tully, Smaller NFL Cities Pay Big for Stadiums, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Apr. 20, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 6184369.

92.
Id.
93.
A Blight on the Law, supra note 10.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2669 (2005) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984)); see also
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
97.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
98.
Id. at 2665-66.
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standard of judicial review for takings justified by economic
development." 99 These justices would have required 'clear and
convincing evidence' that the economic benefits of the plan would in
fact come to pass." 100 Although the Supreme Court rejected this
approach, the Court did not state that all economic development plans
are inherently rational. In applying the rational basis standard of
review, the Court should seriously consider whether or not the
construction of sports stadiums is a rational means of creating
economic growth and development.
Although the arrival of professional sports teams and the
construction of new sports stadiums may contribute to the sense of
community and overall satisfaction of city residents, "there is no
evidence that either the level or the growth rate of real per capita
personal income is enhanced by construction of a sports arena or
stadium." 10 1 Several reasons are suggested for this negative impact.
Public subsidies for such projects "reduce public spending on local
infrastructure, public safety, education, and other forms of economic
development," and often increase taxes. 10 2 In order for any economic
benefit to actually accrue, the funds generated by bringing in sports
franchises must at least equal the amount of money spent on a new
stadium. The majority of the funds being generated by sports
franchises, however, never returns to the local economy; rather it goes
to the salaries of a relatively small number of players (most of whom
are not even residents of the city), scouting and player development
costs, and management fees paid to team owners. 10 3 Furthermore, the
funds generated by these sports franchises are, for the most part, not
new funds from outside sources such as tourists coming in for the
games, but rather from other leisure activities in the local community
such as bowling or going to the movies. 10 4 The income of locally owned
recreation and entertainment facilities would remain in the
community, but "the income of owners and players, driven by stadium
revenues, escapes the local economy ... ."105 Where the funds being
generated by a new sports stadium are merely being redirected from
other leisure activities within the city, it is clear that any economic
benefit is a merely illusory.
99.
Id. at 2661.
100.
Id.
101.
Dennis Coates & Brad R. Humphreys, The Growth Effects of Sports Franchises,
Stadia,and Arenas, 18 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 601, 622 (1999).
102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 614.
104.
Id. at 615.
105.
Id.
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The theory of "if you build it, they will come" does not always
ring true. 10 6 Often, cities build stadiums under the false assumption
that fans will flock to it by the thousands, spending money and
generating an economic boom for the team owners and the
surrounding community. In Atlanta, Georgia, however, the city's
investment in a new baseball field for their hometown team, the
Atlanta Braves, did not increase attendance or sales. In fact, "the
team's attendance tumbled from 3.46 million in 1997, its first year at
Turner Field, to 2.32 million [at the end of the 2004 season]." 10 7 Thus,
new sports stadiums do not always bring the economic boom touted by
politicians in election years. The city of Atlanta would have been
better off leaving their beloved Braves to play on the old field and
investing that money elsewhere. What the city should have asked
itself is "if the money spent on the stadium were used differently,
would the local economy benefit as much or more than it does when
the money is spent on enhancing the sports environment?"1 0 8 Cities
and their consultants often "forget" to consider the opportunity costs
involved with building sports stadiums when developing overly
optimistic economic development plans centered on these stadiums.
Most economists agree that sports stadiums are inherently bad
investments for cities. For example, in New Jersey, the Meadowlands
Stadium is scheduled to be razed and replaced by a new stadium
despite the state's remaining $124 million debt on the old stadium. 10 9
In the case of Indianapolis's new stadium, the Hurst Bean
Company will be condemned to make way for a parking lot, not even
the stadium itself. A parking lot certainly will not generate as much
income as the Bean Company itself, and it will not create the jobs that
the Bean Company has created. So what is the rationale for razing a
lucrative, local business run by local workers who spend their
earnings in the local community to make way for a parking lot, which
generates no income or jobs and creates no economic benefit to the
community? The Indiana Stadium and Convention Center Building
Authority insist that the property is "necessary" for the stadium
project to move forward. 110

106.
FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Pictures 1989).
107.
Tim Tucker, Braves Tackle Attendance Drop, Team Hopes Enhanced Turner
Field Will Draw More Non-Hardcore Fans, CHARLOTE OBSERVER, Apr. 8, 2005, at 4C,
availableat 2005 WLNR 5488984.
Coates & Humphreys, supra note 101, at 602.
108.
109.
Football Giants Getting a New Stadium, CONSTRUCTIONEER, June 20, 2005,
availableat 2005 WLNR 9926723.
110.

Michele McNeil, Stadium Plan Angers Bean Factory,INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept.

22, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 14961159 (emphasis added).
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The building authority needs the Hurst land because of one of the unholy deals it
made with the Colts for the new stadium. The authority agreed to provide 3,000
parking spaces for the new stadium. For every space it doesn't provide within a
certain distance of the stadium, it must provide two spaces. Since the Hurst site
could accommodate 600 spaces, that
would save the authority from having to buy
111
land for as many as 1,200 spaces.

Alternatively, the Hurst Bean Company has proposed a land swap
in which it would trade the northern part of its 41 acre property for
land that is adjacent to the property. 112 Hurst has also agreed to give
the Colts access to its parking lots for games.11 3 In any case, it would
cost the state less to build a garage for the 1,200 necessary parking
spots than it would cost the Bean Company and the local community
to move the factory to another location.1 14 However, under the Court's
current jurisprudence, the Indiana legislature has the sole discretion
to determine whether or not the property is or is not necessary to the
stadium project. Under this scenario, the state is not obligated to
consider alternative solutions to the parking problem. If the state
legislature determines that the development plan as a whole will
benefit the public by creating economic development and growth, then
eminent domain may be used for the entire project, including parking
lots.
The other main issue is whether stadium spending as part of
an economic development plan is merely a pretext of a public purpose.
Courts must ask whether the actual purpose of these stadium projects
is to confer a benefit on the sports franchises and their owners. When
examining the lengths that many cities and states will go to in order
to attract and retain professional sports franchises, the answer is
unclear. The usual process is this: a team owner makes a demand, the
city then either meets that demand to gain or keep a sports team, or it
does not meet the demand and the sports team goes to another city.
The team owner has significant leverage in such situations, especially
in smaller cities. The team owner is usually able to extract any
number of concessions from the city or state. To illustrate, in
Indianapolis, the Colts only have to pay $100 million on the nearly
$500 million stadium, which does not include the city's payment of $48
million to them for breaking their lease on the old stadium. In other
words, the Colts have managed to extract a new stadium from the city
of Indianapolis, while receiving $48 million from the city to play in
this new stadium that they demanded the city build for them. The

111.
112.
113.
114.

A Blight on the Law, supra note 10.
McNeil, supra note 110.
Id.
Id.
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Colts will also receive 100% of the proceeds from naming and publicity
rights for the new stadium. 115 This revenue will likely exceed $50
million over the first five years. 116 This example suggests that cities
eager to attract and retain professional sports franchises might be
fairly willing to create a public purpose in order to accomplish this
goal.
III. SOLUTION: FEDERAL V. STATE LIMITATIONS ON EMINENT DOMAIN

The Court could overrule Kelo and develop a bright-line rule to
prevent cities from using the economic development rationale, or,
short of a bright-line rule, the Court could create a balancing test in
which courts look to the proven economic benefits accruing to the
community, the interests of the property owner, and possible
alternative solutions short of eminent domain. Although there have
been significant changes in the composition of the Court since the Kelo
decision, it is unlikely that the Court will overrule itself in the near
future. The Court specifically noted the difficulty in distinguishing
economic development from other public purposes that it has
recognized and its reluctance to interfere with legislative
prerogative. 117
Judiciary
Committee
Chairman
F.
James
Sensenbrenner notes that Kelo "has the potential of becoming the
Dred Scott Decision of the 21st century." 1 1S Short of waiting 97 years
for another Brown v. Board of Education to come to the rescue of
property owners everywhere, the Court indicated where they could
find salvation. The Court stated in Kelo that, despite its ruling that
economic development constitutes a public use, states are free to adopt
more restrictive measures on the exercise of the takings power.1 19 The
Court also noted that many states have in fact already imposed
stricter "public use" requirements than the federal baseline. 120 The
Court made no mention, however, of the role of the United States
Congress in restricting the states' ability to carry out eminent domain
proceedings under the rationale articulated in Kelo. Indeed, there has
been substantial legislative action in response to Kelo in both state

115.

Colts Challenged to Find Sponsor for New Stadium: Team's Winning Season

Helps, but the Deal Must Stand Alone, Official Says, FORT WAYNE NEWS SENTINEL, Dec.
26, 2005, at S3, available at 2005 WLNR 20948073.
116.
Id.
117.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2667 (2005).
118.
Mike Allen & Charles Babington, House Votes to Undercut High Court on
Property:FederalFunds Tied to Eminent Domain, WASH. POST, July 1, 2005, at Al.
119.
Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2668.

120.

Id.
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legislatures and in Congress. Although Congress cannot explicitly
undo what the Court has said or done, it can effectively undermine the
Court's decision by exercising its power under the Taxing and
12 1
Spending Clause of the Constitution.
In an attempt to combat the logical extreme of the Court's
eminent domain jurisprudence, 122 members of both the United States
House of Representatives and Senate have proposed legislation to
limit the states' power to take land under an economic development
rationale. On June 27, 2005, Senator John Cornyn introduced the
123
Protection of Homes, Small Businesses, and Private Property Act.
The Act states, "The power of eminent domain shall be available only
for public use," which "shall not be construed to include economic
development."'' 24 Further, it specifies that it applies to "all exercises of
eminent domain power by the Federal Government; and ... by State
and local government through the use of Federal funds."1 25 Cornyn's
legislation attempts to rein in Kelo by preventing governments from
using economic development as a basis for the use of eminent domain.
Likewise, on June 30, 2005, the House voted to use Congress's
spending power to undermine the Kelo ruling that economic
development is a "public use" under the Fifth Amendment. 126 The
House measure was passed as an amendment to an appropriations bill
and
would deny federal funds to any city or state project that used eminent domain to
force people to sell their property to make way for a profit-making project such as a
hotel or mall .... A fact sheet said that under the bill the locality or state would
"lose any federal funds
that would contribute in any way to the project the property
127
would be taken for."

Thus, the bill that the House passed in June would serve to "prevent
federal transportation funds from being used to make improvements
on lands seized for private development.' 28
A similar bill was later introduced by Representative F. James
Sensenbrenner on October 25, 2005.129 The Private Property Rights

121.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
122.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("if predicted ... positive
side-effects are enough to render transfer from one private party to another constitutional,
then the words 'for public use' do not realistically exclude any takings, and thus do not
exert any constraint on the eminent domain power").
123. S.1313, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005).
124. Id. § 3(a)-(b).
125.
Id. § 3(c).
126. Allen & Babington, supra note 118.
127.
Id.
128. Greg Simmons, Bipartisan Support for Eminent Domain Reform,
FOxNEWS.COM, Sept. 20, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,169926,00.html.
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Protection Act would require that "No State . . . shall exercise its
power of eminent domain . . . over property to be used for . . . [or]
subsequently used for economic development, if that State ... receives
Federal economic development funds during any fiscal year in which it
does so.'' 130 Additionally, the Act mandates that "[t]he Federal
Government or any authority of the Federal Government shall not
exercise its power of eminent domain to be used for economic
development." 131 Importantly, the Act defines "economic development":
The term
consent of
person or
carried on

"economic development" means taking private property, without the
the owner, and conveying or leasing such property from one private
entity to another private person or entity for commercial enterprise
for profit, or to increase tax revenue, tax base, employment, or general

economic health ....

132

Defining the term clarifies congressional intent and ensures that
legislatures and courts will not misconstrue the Act's limits on the use
of eminent domain.
Enactment of any of the current legislation will require cities
and states to think twice before resorting to eminent domain for their
stadium projects. Doing so would keep them from receiving any
federal funds related to the project, and with such huge projects
requiring many infrastructure upgrades, it would inevitably be more
than a mere drop in the proverbial bucket. In Newark, New Jersey,
the housing authority diverted $3.9 million in federal funds meant for
low-income residents to a new arena intended to prevent the Nets
basketball team from moving to Brooklyn. 13 3 Under the bills proposed
in both the House and Senate, New Jersey would lose these funds if it
resorts to eminent domain to secure the land for such a project. A
narrow withholding of federal funds, however, could have little impact
on the advancement of the project under political pressure to build the
stadium. Also, these bills will have no effect on those projects that do
not need to rely on federal funding to continue.
In an attempt to address the shortcomings of such narrow
legislation and substantially impact a state's eminent domain power
under Kelo, former House Majority Leader Tom Delay and Majority
Whip Roy Blunt wanted to "push for a more inclusive measure that
would apply to all federal funds." 134 Indeed, on October 19, 2005,

129.
H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005).
130.
Id. at § 2(a)
131.
Id. at § 3.
132.
Id. at § 8(1).
133.
Damien Cave, While Devils Get a Home, Newark's Poor Keep Looking, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2005, availableat 2005 WLNR 6802131.
134.
Allen & Babington, supra note 118.
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Senator John Ensign introduced a much broader bill, also named the
Private Property Rights Protection Act, which would limit the states'
power of eminent domain even further. 135 The Act stated that when a
state condemns property pursuant to its eminent domain power, and
the property is not condemned for a proper "public use," then that
state would "not be eligible to receive any Federal funds, including any
funds appropriated by Congress or otherwise expended from the
Federal treasury."'136 The Act, in defining "public use," stated that
property is put to a proper "public use" when it is:
[(A)](i) used by a governmental entity; (ii) owned, operated, or maintained by a
government entity and used by the public as a right-of-way; or (iii) used by a
common carrier; and (B) includes ... (ix) ... public buildings, [such as] ... (V)
sports stadiums ... [and] other public entertainment venues provided that any
takings for these projects is limited solely to the real property necessary for-(aa)
the construction of such stadiums ... ; and (bb) parking facilities ... [for] such
stadiums ....

137

Although the Act makes specific exceptions for sports stadiums, it
does so under the implication that they are "public buildings."' 38 Thus,
the Act would still apply to private sports stadiums and could also
potentially apply to semi-privately owned or financed sports stadiums.
Even so, Ensign's proposed bill, if passed, most likely would be
struck down by the Supreme Court as an unconstitutional exercise of
Congress's spending power under South Dakota v. Dole. In South
Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court set limits on Congress's use of the
spending power. 139 In so doing, the Court held that Congress does not
exceed those limits by conditioning a state's receipt of federal highway
funds on its enactment of a minimum drinking age of twenty-one
years old. 140 The Spending Clause in the Constitution states that
Congress has the power to 'lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States."''
Incident to this power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal
funds, and has repeatedly employed the power "to further broad policy objectives
by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon 142
compliance by the recipient with
federal statutory and administrative directives."

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

S. 1895, 109th Cong. (2005).
Id. § 4 (2005) (emphasis added).
Id. §3.
Id.
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 203 (1987).
Id. at 212.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)).

166

VANDERBILTJ OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 9: 1:1

The Dole Court made clear that Congress need not be able to regulate
the activity directly when it is relying expressly on its spending
power. 143 The Court noted four limitations on Congress's spending
power: (1) "the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of
'the general welfare,"' and "courts should defer substantially to the
judgment of Congress" in determining whether such an action is for
the general welfare; 144 (2) any condition on federal funds must be set
forth unambiguously, thus "enabl[ing] the States to exercise their
choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation";1 45 (3) conditions on federal grants must be related "to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs"; 146 (4)
"other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to
14 7
the conditional grant of federal funds."'
In her dissent, however, Justice O'Connor attacked the
majority's conclusion that minimum drinking age laws are sufficiently
related to the federal interest in funding interstate highways: "If the
spending power is to be limited only by Congress' notion of the general
welfare, the reality, given the vast financial resources of the Federal
Government, is that the Spending Clause gives power to the Congress
to tear down the barriers, to invade the states' jurisdiction, and to
become a parliament of the whole people, subject to no restrictions
save such as are self-imposed."'148 Justice O'Connor also took issue
49
with the majority's application of the federal interest requirement.
In O'Connor's view, the Court's current application of the federal
interest requirement is too broad, and thus "Congress could effectively
regulate almost any area of a State's social, political, or economic life
on the theory that use of the interstate transportation system is
150
somehow enhanced."'
Thus, under the rule of Dole, the Private Property Rights
Protection Act would almost certainly fail the federal interest
requirement. Under the Act, there is no requirement of any relation
whatsoever between the federal government's condition on federal
funds and the federal interest in such a national project. 15' Instead,

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
from using

Id.
Id. at 207.
Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
Id. at 208.
Id. at 217 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936)).
Id. at 212 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 215.
Here, the condition on receiving federal funds would be that the state abstains
eminent domain to condemn land pursuant to an economic redevelopment plan.
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Congress is conditioning the receipt of federal funds on a state
abstention from using eminent domain procedures to condemn land
pursuant to an economic development plan. Some of the federal funds
received by states are in the form of federal hospital funding.
Therefore, under the Act, if a state uses eminent domain as part of an
economic development plan, Congress will cease federal funds for the
state's hospitals. It is difficult to relate hospital funding to a state's
eminent domain power, yet such a relationship is required under Dole.
To make the condition constitutional, Congress must argue that there
is some rational relationship between limiting a state's power of
eminent domain and keeping public hospitals open. This example
illustrates that such a broad condition on the receipt of federal funds
is merely a thinly veiled attempt by Congress to regulate state activity
and would thus be unconstitutional.
It seems, therefore, that property owners' best bet is to rely on
state legislatures to expand their property rights. Many states, in fact,
already had more restrictive statutes before the Kelo decision, and
many more have acted since in order to reassure their citizens that
their rights are protected.
Colorado, for example, amended its
eminent domain law just prior to Kelo to restrict the use of eminent
domain by redevelopment agencies seeking to transfer private
property from one private party to another by adding the requirement
that a property must first be determined to be blighted itself or
"located in a blighted area," or it must be determined that the
exclusion of the property in a condemnation proceeding for a larger
parcel of land would render the "redevelopment or rehabilitation of the
remaining parcels . . . not viable under the urban renewal plan."'152
Many other states have adopted similar restrictions requiring a
finding of blight or necessity before lawful resort to eminent domain
procedures. 15 3 In Indiana, property must first be defined as blighted
before it may be properly taken under the state's current eminent
domain laws. 54 The major problem with state laws which require

152.

H.B. 1203, 64th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2004).

153.
See NEv. REV. STAT. § 279.471(1) (2005)("[A]n agency may exercise the power of
eminent domain to acquire property for a redevelopment project only if the agency adopts a
resolution that includes a written finding by the agency that a condition of blight exists for
each individual parcel of property to be acquired by eminent domain."); id. § 279.471(2)
("[A]n agency may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property for a
redevelopment project only if: (a) The property sought to be acquired is necessary to carry
out the redevelopment plan ..
"); see also S.B. 184, 2005 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2005)
(prohibiting a "redevelopment agency from adopting a project area plan for certain
redevelopment projects from July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2006 unless a blight study has
been commissioned and completed by certain dates").
154.
A Blight on the Law, supra note 10.
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blight as a prerequisite to any taking for economic development
purposes is that many of the laws (such as in Indiana) are very poorly
155
drafted, so "just about any parcel can be declared blighted."
Accordng to Samuel R. Staley, Director of Urban and Land Use for the
Reason Foundation, "Over the years ... [the] term (urban blight) has
become little more than a name for property a government wants to
take." 156 Thus, property owners may not be able to sufficiently rely on
state legislators to protect their property rights, especially when those
legislators are faced with the political pressures associated with
bringing a large professional sports franchise to town, or perhaps
more importantly, keeping them in town. For example, Texas recently
passed a statute restricting eminent domain, but the statute expressly
exempted any voter approved sports and entertainment facility from
the strictures of the act.157
Due to limits on the federal government's power to regulate
state activity, 158 and on the states' inability or unwillingness to
sufficiently rein in their own power, the only real solution may be a
federal constitutional amendment. Use of a constitutional amendment
to address what the country sees as a misstep by the Supreme Court
has been effective in past. In fact, four amendments have been passed
to address such situations:1 59 (1) the Eleventh Amendment,160 which
overruled Chisolm v. Georgia;161 (2) the Thirteenth Amendment 62 and
the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, 163 which overruled
Dred Scott v. Sanford; 64 (3) the Sixteenth Amendment, 165 which

155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
S.B. 7, 79th Leg. 2d Sess. (Tex. 2005).
As previously discussed, Congress may not explicitly overrule the Supreme

Court and, in the case of eminent domain, is limited to exercising its power under the

taxing and spending clause of the Constitution. See supra text accompanying note 121.
159.
Joan Schaffner, The Federal Marriage Amendment: To Protect the Sanctity of
Marriage or Destroy Constitutional Democracy?, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1487, 1518 (2005)
(citing Thomas Baker, Towards a "MorePerfect Union": Some Thoughts on Amending the
Constitution, 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 1, 9 n.37 (2000) ("Three other amendments could be
understood to impliedly reject earlier Supreme Court understandings of the Constitution:
The Seventeenth Amendment (1913) (direct election of Senators); the Nineteenth
Amendment (1920) (women's suffrage); and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (1964)
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160.
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2 U.S. 419 (1793).
162.
U.S. CONST.amend. XIII.
163.
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60 U.S. 393 (1856).
165.
U.S. CONST.amend. XVI.
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overruled Pollack v. Farmer'sLoan & Trust Co.;166 and (4) the TwentySixth Amendment, 167 which overruled Oregon v. Mitchell. 168 "[E]ach
amendment was in harmony with the basic principles that underlie
the Constitution-individual rights, separation of powers, and
federalism. Moreover, in the cases where fundamental liberty
interests were at stake, the amendment reestablished individual
69
rights in light of the Court's limited interpretation of those rights."'
Consistent with these cases, at issue in the present case are
fundamental liberty interests. As James Madison wrote in the
Federalist Papers, "Government is instituted no less for the protection
of property, than of the persons, of individuals." 170 The Supreme Court
itself also clearly stated the fundamental nature of property rights in
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, when it stated that "possessing
property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and
unalienable rights of man."'171 Moreover, Justice Story, in Wilkinsin v.
Leland, stated that
[G]overnment can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights of property are
left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body, without any restraint. The
fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require;
that the rights of
172
personal liberty and private property, should be held sacred.

Thus, it is clear that the use of the amendment power to overrule the
Court's decision in Kelo is consistent with basic democratic principles
and necessary to secure the fundamental and inherent right of man to
his own private property.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court held in Kelo v. City of New London that
economic development qualified as a valid public use, and therefore
that eminent domain could be used to convert private property into
commercial space. 173
Such an application of eminent domain
ultimately fails in the context of professional sports stadiums. Finding
that a professional sports stadium qualifies as a public use under the
166.
158 U.S. 601 (1895).
167.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
168.
400 U.S. 112 (1970).
169.
Schaffner, supra note 159, at 1519.
170.
THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (James Madison).
171.
2 U.S. 304, 310 (1795).
172.
27 U.S. 627, 657 (1829).
173.
Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665 (2005) (holding that because
the redevelopment scheme invoking eminent domain "unquestionably serves a public
purpose, the takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth
Amendment").
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rationale of economic development ignores the fact that stadiums are
often more of a burden to tax payers and the economy than they are
sound economic planning.
Recognizing the Court's potential misstep in Kelo, Congress
has acted to limit the states' ability to pursue such projects through
the use of eminent domain. Congress's authority, however, to
sufficiently rein in state action where the court has ruled it
constitutional, stops short of the security land owners ultimately seek.
Thus, it is left in the states' hands to limit their own power of eminent
domain to that which will satisfy angry property owners and voters.
Based upon current and past legislation, it is unclear whether states
will go far enough in protecting property owners' rights from such
invasions. Therefore, the only way to resolve this issue is through a
constitutional amendment narrowly defining "public use," and
excluding from such the availability of any economic development
rationale.
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